讲题：Realist-Expressivism and Ways of Thinking

时间：2016年5月17日10：00-12：00

地点：人文学院南光一214室

报告人：David Copp

报告人简介：

柯普博士是加州大学戴维斯分校杰出教授（Distinguished Professor），其主要的研究领域为道德哲学和政治哲学。曾任加拿大人文社会科学委员会成员，Ethics杂志副主编，Canadian Journal of Philosophy编辑，斯坦福哲学百科全书“元伦理学”领域的执行主编。

报告内容简介：

Realist-expressivism is a hybrid theory of the meaning of moral predicates. It says that a moral predicate used to make a simple moral assertion both ascribes a moral property and expresses a corresponding conative attitude. More specifically, the thesis is that each moral predicate “M” takes a moral property M-ness as its semantic value and is also used to express a characteristic corresponding conative attitude C-M in virtue of linguistic conventions or assertability norms governing its use. According to the specific version of realist-expressivism that I favor, simple moral assertions using moral terms typically express the speaker’s commitment to a relevant moral policy (or general intention), and they do so in virtue of conventions of felicitous use governing these terms (Copp 2007b, 180-181, 185-193; Copp 2009, 186-187) – “expressive conventions,” as I will call them. For instance, I say, a person who asserts “Lying is wrong” both expresses the belief that lying is wrong and expresses her commitment to a policy of opposing and avoiding wrongful acts, (Copp 2007b, 181-185). Other versions of realist-expressivism disagree about the nature of the conative attitudes expressed by moral assertions and about the idea of expression.

One objection to realist-expressivism has long troubled me, an objection about moral belief. Indeed, I now realize that there actually are two such objections. The first is an objection to my idea that realist-expressivism can reconcile the realist view that moral thought is cognitive and representational with the expressivist view that moral thought involves an element of endorsement or a conative element. The second objection is that realist-expressivism makes room for a distinction in moral thought where, by its own lights, none is to be found. Fortunately, I believe I have finally seen how best to respond to these objections, and I believe that they can be answered in the same way.

To explain, the first objection is that realist-expressivism does not explain moral thought in a way that addresses the expressivist’s and the internalist’s contention that moral thought involves a kind of endorsement. It stands on the point that realist-expressivism is a theory about language rather than a theory about thought. Even if it is correct that moral assertions involve a kind of endorsement, realist-expressivism says nothing about the nature of moral thought as such. It therefore cannot explain how the realist view that moral thoughts are representational can be reconciled with the expressivist view that moral thought has an affective element.

The second objection begins with the thought that if realist-expressivism is correct, there should be a distinction between motivationally charged, “internal” normative beliefs and motivationally disengaged, “external” normative beliefs, a distinction that parallels the intuitive distinction between derogatory or bigoted beliefs and their neutral counterparts. Yet realist-expressivism seems incapable of explaining the difference. Stipulate that the term “wrong-minus” stands to “wrong” as “Catholic” stands to “papist” – according a hybrid account of pejoratives that is analogous to realist-expressivism, Given this stipulation, if realist-expressivism is correct, there should be a difference between the belief that lying is “wrong” and the belief that lying is “wrong-minus” just as there is a difference between bigoted beliefs and their neutral counterparts. Yet there does not appear to be such a difference, and, worse, realist-expressivism appears unable to explain what the difference would be since it implies that the belief that lying is “wrong” and the belief that it is “wrong-minus” would have the same content.

My strategy for responding to the objections involves drawing two distinctions. I will contend that there is not (or there would not be) in fact a difference between the content of the belief that something is wrong and the content of the belief that something is wrong-minus. But, I will claim, the two distinctions can be used to show that there is nevertheless a significant difference between the beliefs. The first distinction is between “contents of belief” and “belief states,” or “ways of thinking” of the content of a belief. The second is between what I shall call “internal” and “ordinary” ways of thinking of normative properties. My argument focuses on the idea that people who have beliefs with the same content can think of this content in different ways. I contend that, for example, people who share beliefs about which kinds of action are wrong can nevertheless be thinking of wrongness in importantly different ways. This simple idea is the key, I think, to answering the two objections about belief.