Research Article

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Ritual revolutions: Temple and Trust networks linking Putian and Southeast Asia

Abstract: This paper examines the historical formation and contemporary flourishing of certain temple and trust networks that emerged from the Xinghua area along the coast of Fujian province in the late 19th century, and spread across Southeast Asia over the last 150 years. This article examines three out of at least eight different networks that spread from this region to Southeast Asia (Fujiangsheng, Putianshi difangzhi, 2001). These are the 1) Spirit medium Altar Association networks; 2) extended lineage networks; and 3) Buddhist master-disciple networks. These ritual “trust networks” were constructed from cosmopolitical ritual technologies that were transportable, like the portable altar of a Daoist priest, the incense ash of a local god’s temple, methods of collective spirit medium training, or rites conducted before the spirit tablet of an ancestor or a master monk. This paper shows how these ritual methods were employed in a great variety of different political and multi-ethnic settings around Southeast Asia. These networks had a powerful impact on their founding villages and local cultures as well. Rather than simply preserving traditional forms, these networks engaged in continuous ritual revolution, constantly negotiating the forces of modernity within evolving ritual contexts.

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1 Introduction

The spread of religious networks is one of the most important cultural aspects of globalization today. The revival over the past thirty years of hundreds of thousands of popular god temples and their local ritual traditions in rural South and Southeast China is closely related to the renewed flows of ritual knowledge, funding, labor, and faith within the temple networks linking numerous temples in these regions to an extended network of branch temples across Southeast Asia. Although these transforming networks and their ritual traditions are less well known than the rapid spread of Christianity in northern China, they are nonetheless a powerful force within everyday rural life in a changing China.

This paper examines the historical formation and contemporary flourishing of certain networks that emerged from the Xinghua area along the coast of Fujian province in the late 19th century, and spread across Southeast Asia over the last 150 years. The Xinghua region is made up of the two counties of Putian and Xianyou, whose 3 million inhabitants speak a local dialect called Puxianhua, which is incomprehensible to the Fuzhou and Fuqing Minbei speakers to their north, and to the Minnan Hokkien speakers to their south and west. Some 600,000 Puxian sojourners, emigrants and their descendants live in Southeast Asia. This article describes three out of at least eight different networks that spread from this region to Southeast Asia (Fujiangsheng, Putianshi difangzhi, 2001). These are the 1) Spirit medium Altar Association networks; 2) extended lineage networks; and 3) Buddhist master-disciple networks.

Marshall Sahlins (1993) pointed out that Southeast Asia was the key region in which one can study the early history of globalization. This was a long process which took place in everyday interactions between members of multiple ethnic and religious communities living in close proximity in the port towns of Southeast Asia over the past several hundred years. This long history of amazingly rich everyday interactions constitutes a deep reservoir of accumulated knowledge of ways to manage intercultural interactions that deserves to be theorized in its own right.

Charles Tilly (2005, 2010, 2010a) examined a range of trust networks (including religious networks) in terms of their relations with centers of power, especially Western nation-states. On one axis, he set out a series of relationships from segregation, to negotiated connection, to full integration with state powers. On the other axis of the means of connection, he discussed forms of coercion, extending from the workings of capital to degrees of...
commitment to state power. This framework proved very fruitful for his own analysis of trust networks in various Western state formations, from totalitarian to democratic. Of course, he was interested in how trust networks become integrated into civil society under democratic states.

But society in Southeast Asia was far too multifarious for any theory based on a unitary public sphere. In these regions, imperial, colonial, and post-colonial governments supervised a broad range of ethno-political entities, many with their own legal and para-legal codes and procedures for the control of their own populations. One example would be the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, as can be seen for example in the Gongguan institution in Batavia, and the related kapitan system (Blussé, L. and Chen Menghong, 2003). Such pockets of self-regulation vastly complicated the layers and forms of governance in the region. And this meant that the religious networks had to engage with a very complex mix of political institutions in addition to the colonial state. This in turn made far more complex the modes of integration (or exclusion) of trust networks than those which can be placed into Tilly’s model. The historical complexity of the Southeast Asian region makes the construction of an adequate model of relations between trust networks and various kinds of state and state-like entities much more challenging. Detailed research into Southeast Asian networks should do more than simply yield additional data to fit into Western theoretical models, or to put it another way, lead only to forms of local knowledge. This study is a first step towards a broader theorizing of the Southeast Asian networks in their specificity and their complexity.

The study of Chinese networks in Southeast Asia has primarily concentrated on mapping trading routes, and assessing the role of Chinese merchants in these commodity circuits (Tagliacozzo, E. and Wen-Chin Chang, 2011). However, it is important to note that ritual procedures were central in building trust within these trading networks. For example, when commercial disputes arose, Chinese merchants were often asked to swear before the gods that they were speaking the truth in their mercantile dealings. This could involve burning a written pledge, smashing a bowl, or decapitating a chicken in front of the god’s statue inside a temple (Katz, P. 2008). A whole network of Chinese temples in the port cities of Southeast Asia played this role, particularly City God temples or early temples, some dedicated to Guanyin, others to Mazu, or Tianhou, Goddess of the Sea. Wang Gongwu (1990) pointed out that the Hokkien merchant network in Southeast Asian operated outside of the protection of the Chinese state. This network had to develop its own trust building mechanisms. Most City God temples come equipped with a great abacus for calculating the true and the false, one’s merits and demerits. This is Confucian morality brought down to the most instrumental level – and calculated on an abacus. These were among the key techniques developed within the Chinese trading system to develop trust in business partners in long distance trade ventures, in the absence of state sanctions.

Of course, underlying and funding many of these temples were the great Chinese business families and extended lineages, the different dialect groups and their huiguan (regional business associations) and tongxianghui (native place associations), and the brotherhoods that enforced their mutually exclusive limits and economic niches. Yet all of these institutions had altars dedicated to the gods of their distinct regional pantheons, and they conducted rituals before their altars on a regular basis. Each trade association had its own temple. Each brotherhood had its rituals (ter Haar, 1998). And each family had its own altar for the worship of their ancestors and the gods of their local dialect and regional pantheons. One could go so far as to say that the Chinese family was primarily a ritual unit, rather than a biological unit. We have more to learn about the role of and the interaction between the Chinese temple, family-lineage, and native place association networks in Southeast Asia in building long distance trust networks.

Some religious networks, for example Buddhist traders or monks, may have seen themselves as somehow free of or detached from political concerns, or even non-political. Not just in terms of their evasion of different political powers encountered along their routes. Some religious networks reject national identities in place of either more local identities or more universal identities. One needs to respect the utopian power that can be found within many such religious networks, as these values motivated people to transfer wealth into religious merit and temple building, to re-circulate their wealth through charities, or more radically, to direct their profits into ritual fasting, and establish mechanisms to ensure that their earnings support the network only in order to support the Dharma.

The networks examined in this paper moved and continue to flow past political borders and boundaries. They are incredibly flexible and develop fluid networking strategies. Many transcend or reshape ethnic or kinship boundaries while bringing their members into very specific

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1 For further discussion of the limits of Tilly’s models, see Hanagan, M and C. Tilly, 2010), and the other articles in this double issue of Theory and Society.
regimes of exchange and reciprocity and mobilization. New religious networks in Southeast Asia have continually layered themselves onto the kaleidoscopic pattern of pre-existing networks, drawing upon the reservoir of shared symbolic capital within these networks, redirecting these resources towards their own ends, sometimes moralizing or expanding the sense of the self, or introducing a sense of belonging to a universal community beyond the bounds of the nation or any ethnicity.

Of course there was a darker side to these networks as well, as many displayed extreme forms of exclusivity and the capture of all kinds of forces, from human labor to gender roles. There are also issues of competition and conversion within and between religious networks and communities, and some cases of wholesale conversion of elements of one network into another.

The networks discussed in the paper can also be seen as part of the ongoing expansion of religious connectivity and communication in Asia. Many networks are now exploring contemporary techniques and using new technologies to spread their message(s) and connect their adherents together across Southeast Asia and the world as a whole.

2 Ritual Revolutions

On the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, it is important to recall the key role of the Chinese Overseas in this vital turning point in modern Chinese history. As revolutionaries, reformers, financial backers, promoters of educational and social reform, the Chinese Overseas acted as a force of modernity. They were active proponents of modernization. One thinks of figures like Tang Kah Kee (1874-1961), based in Singapore, who played very active roles in reform movements – sponsoring colleges and educational reform, advocating for social reforms, encouraging urban planning and village regulation and reconstruction, and contributing to a new architectural style.

Anti-imperialist revolts led by leaders with ties to Chinese Overseas can be traced back further into the 19th century in Fujian. One of the leaders of the Xiaodaohui (Small Knives) revolt was the son of a Chinese Overseas merchant. The role of Chinese overseas in leading or bankrolling military forces can also be seen in the local defense corps active in the 1920s in Jinjiang that were sponsored by the Chinese overseas in Philippines.

But there was another side to the impact of the Chinese Overseas on their home communities, namely the preservation (or re-invention) of tradition. Many Chinese Overseas supported the building of ancestral halls and temples in their home villages. Religion and ritual played a major role in their community enclaves overseas, where they sponsored and participated in branch temples whose incense was carried from founding temples in their ancestral villages in Southern China. From this perspective, Chinese overseas can be seen as a force of tradition and the preservation of culture.

The Chinese Overseas are often discussed in terms of the major turning points of Chinese modern history – the Xinhai Revolution, in which their support played a crucial role, the establishment of the CCP, when many Chinese Overseas went back to China to contribute to the socialist experiment, the Cultural Revolution, during which many Chinese Overseas felt abandoned by China, and determined to preserve their cultural traditions during that iconoclastic era., and finally the Deng era, in which the Chinese Overseas have recovered their earlier role as leading innovators, but primarily as investors, factory owners, and financial speculators. These Chinese Overseas business leaders have been described by Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini as flexible citizens of an ungrounded empire (Ong and Nonini 1997; Ong 1999).

The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a fundamental shift in global capitalism as it developed systems of flexible accumulation, characterized by rapid flows of financial capital, outsourcing of factories to areas with cheap labor, and the development of a cadre of technical mid-level office workers and technicians, along with an elite of high-flying capitalist business leaders and financiers. These economic changes profoundly affected the corridors linking Chinese overseas with their home villages and regions in China. Business leaders became flexible citizens and harbingers of an alternative Asian modernity (Ong and Nonini 1997; Ong 1999). But as they also point out, laborers were also forced into new patterns of mobility, as were mid-level office workers. These changes occurred simultaneously with political overtures that opened the blocked networks of the extended Chinese Overseas transnational spaces. From this perspective, the Chinese Overseas in the last few decades can be seen as a force of flexible capitalism under conditions of globalization.

This essay sets out to problematize some of these categories, oppositions and understandings. The first issue is the very nature of the Chinese Overseas. As Philip Kuhn (2009) has pointed out in his sweeping overview Chinese Amongst Others, many Chinese overseas
conceived of themselves as sojourners abroad, living and moving within corridors linking their spaces of operation in Southeast Asia to their home village or region – these corridors are a kind of translocal stretching of space. In a recent paper (Dean, n.d.), I have sketched out a continuum of qiaoxiang (Sojourner villages), from those in which only a handful of families or surname groups have exclusive footholds abroad, to villages in which virtually every household has relatives in Southeast Asia. The spatial imaginary of these villagers is very extensive, and not only imaginary – by joining into chain-migration networks, villagers can and do move back and forth from their villages in China to Southeast Asia and beyond. And as Peggy Levitt (2004, 2007) reminds us, gods do not need passports.

A second issue is the diversity of Chinese Overseas. They are members of many distinct regional cultures, and speak many different dialects. They also worship gods from each of their distinct regional pantheons, and practice distinct ritual traditions and ritual forms. In some parts of Southeast Asia, these communities maintain local opera, regional music, regional Daoist ritual specialists, and forms of spirit mediumism specific to their ancestral locales. Moreover, Chinese overseas are often members of multiple networks. Thus they may belong to the regional native-place huiguan, but also to temples linked to their villages of origin, or participate voluntarily in a religious movement that expanded into Southeast Asia from their home region. They very likely will also be sponsors of Buddhist monasteries in Southeast Asia, many of which will be linked through master disciple ties back to their ancestral homes in South and Southeast China.

Thirdly, Chinese overseas are not just preservers of traditions, but also introduced many cultural, social and ritual innovations back into their home regions within China. I will discuss some examples of ritual change that took place in Southeast Asia, and which were then introduced back into the local cultural system in China. I will suggest that this is part of a very long process, stretching back at least 500-600 years – a process which does not easily connect to standard kinds of historical periodization.

The three examples I will discuss here occurred within the ritual networks extending from Putian,
Fujian to Southeast Asia. Putian emigration to Southeast Asia was a late phenomenon, compared to the Minnan Hokkien migrations, which has been going on since the 15th century, if not before. There were of course much earlier records of transnational trading from the Xinghua region, including a Song dynasty inscription from Putian which describes how a Chinese captain sailed to Srijava (most likely to what is now called Pelambang or Zhugang (Great Harbour)), and returned with a hundredfold profit (Dean and Zheng, 1995). However, large scale Xinghua emigration took place only during the late 19th and early 20th century. Upon reaching Singapore and Malaysia they found themselves excluded from most kinds of work by better established immigrant communities such as the Hokkien, the Cantonese, the Hakka, and the Teochow. The Xinghua (Henghwa) sojourners concentrated their efforts in one extremely fast changing niche in the local economy – the transportation industry. Starting out as rickshaw pullers and clerks in British bicycle shops, Xinhua entrepreneurs soon set up their own chain of shops selling bikes and spare parts and repairs. Following the exponential expansion of the industry, which they effectively monopolized through their networks of spare parts distributors, they went into motorcycle, cars and spare parts, public buses, ethanol plants, and Mercedes Benz dealerships. Nowadays some of the Xinghua businessmen are amongst the wealthiest economic leaders in Indonesia. But many of these global business tycoons were also trained as spirit mediums.

The irrigated Putian plain was originally 30 meters under the sea. It was reclaimed from the sea over a 100 year period. There are four major irrigation systems that converge in this alluvial plain, and every village has a primary, secondary or tertiary irrigation canal running through it. Three of the irrigation systems eventually were integrated into one massive, complex system, which relies on sluice-gates to keep freshwater in the canals during high tide, and releases the diverted river water out the gates during low tide. Around the beginning of the 16th century, this area saw the establishment of the first ritual alliances, which merged several villages and lineages clustered along a particular canal into multi-village alliances marked by common ritual processions and higher order temples. These temples served as the management center for the irrigation system. They coordinated maintenance of the canals with similar multi-village alliances throughout the irrigation system. Over time 150 such alliances evolved on the Putian plain, into which 724 villages were gathered. Occasionally, it was necessary to call upon the state to rebuild dikes along stretches of reclaimed land along the sea or the river mouth, or to enforce certain ratios of water distribution at key nodes in the system, and to arbitrate over disputes. But given the ever increasing complexity of the irrigation system, the majority of these issues were handled locally, by the higher order temple irrigation committees. By the 19th century, the irrigation system was in decline, with disputes spreading virally within the system. Tremendous population pressure, competition over water rights, siltation up of the canals, and the collapse of state control made it even more difficult to handle conflict within the irrigation system. The villages of the Putian plain broke up into a checkerboard of competing banner alliances, one set of villages against the next. These conflicts simply exacerbated the decline of the system, and water shortages and drought were widespread (Dean and Zheng, 2 vols, 2010).

These tensions led to increasing emigration, and this emigration generated at least 8 different kinds of translocal or transnational networks: 1) extended-lineage groups, 2) networks based on village temples, 3) networks based on ritual alliance temples, 4) networks of Spirit medium Altar Associations, 5) networks of the 3 in 1 religious movement, 6) networks of master disciple links between Xinghua Buddhist monks, 7) networks of fishermen and smugglers with ancestral homes in the region known as jiewai (Beyond the Limits - of the Qing dynasty coastal evacuation of the 1660s-1680s), and 8) last but not least, the networks of Methodist pioneer emigrants who began to build a New Jerusalem in Sibu, in the jungles of Borneo in 1910-11, under the leadership of Huang Naishing (Wong Naisong, 1849-1924).

Our recent survey of ritual activities in 724 villages on the Putian plain (Dean and Zheng 2010) documents the central role of communal rituals dedicated to the popular gods in the villages of Putian, Fujian. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the change of official policies regarding religious activity in 1979, thousands of temples have been rebuilt, local ritual traditions have been reinvented, and esoteric rites have been slowly reasssembled or improvised across the Putian plain. These volumes demonstrate the importance of these rituals dedicated to the gods by the villagers in this region by showing their distribution and frequency in every village on the plain.

We found that village temples, and ritual alliances they have formed, generate a “second government” which addresses certain local concerns more effectively than the state and its local government officials (Dean 2001). The village temples are at the center of the celebrations of the birthdays and festivals of the gods. They organize processions of villagers that trace the boundaries of their
ritual territories and alliances. They hold training sessions for spirit mediums who transmit the blessings of the gods to each household in the village. Village temples also invite Daoist and other ritual specialists to perform rites inside the temple as the processions, spirit medium exorcistic dances, and opera performances go on outside. They are also important centers of local political, economic, social and moral power. The temples are living cultural centers of the villages. During idle moments, they provide a place for the elderly to gather and play cards or mahjong, while individual worshippers burn incense and present offerings to the gods, and children play. Village rituals centered on these temples are continuing to successfully negotiate the forces of capitalism and nationalism while preserving a vibrant space for the celebration of local cultural difference.

What do the complex village rites and processions of the Putian plain tell us about the nature of ritual, community and identity in Southeast China, and beyond into the religious networks stretching to Southeast Asia? Rituals in this area and in these networks incorporate many different liturgical frameworks and allow for multiple points of view, all the while mobilizing the entire village population (or network membership) into celebrations for the gods. These rites are an intensification of everyday life, featuring an acceleration of the flow of gifts and competitive displays of local power, rather than a sacred or solemn time set apart from some mundane realm. And many of these events feature returned Overseas Chinese funding, ritual knowledge, participation, or management at a distance.

2.1 Spirit Medium Altar Association Networks

1). The Oversea Chinese Spirit medium *tanban* Altar Association network has its origins in the collective training of spirit mediums in the temples of the Jiangkou region of Putian (Dean and Zheng, 1993). One of the early centers of this tradition was the Jiulidong (Nine Carp Cavern Temple) in Shiting village in Putian. Some of the mediums from this temple traveled to Singapore in the 1920s, where they maintained the cults to their deities on makeshift altars. By the 1950s they had built a temple in Singapore. Further temples in the network were built in Indonesia (in Tibing Tingi and Kirasan in the 1960s, and in Medan and Jakarta in the 1970s). Related temples were built in Serembang and Kuching in Malaysia. The cult maintained its activities even as many members of the Overseas Xinghua community rose to positions of considerable wealth through their near monopolization of the transportation sector across Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. They preserved their local ritual traditions during the period of the Cultural Revolution in China, and were well positioned to return to Putian in the 1980s and ‘90s to rebuild temples, conduct training sessions, and introduce ritual innovations such as female spirit writing groups.

Spirit writing groups dedicated to opening communication with a goddess named Ou Xiangu (Immortal Maiden Ou) were founded in the Tibing Tingi Jiulidong temple in the 1970s. The women in this cult developed a parallel set of initiation rites to that of the men. Successful completion of the initiation training sessions were marked by Daoist and Buddhist diplomas, as in the case of the men. The women now join in the collective group dance of the male mediums and their altar associates. But the women dance counter-clockwise, weaving around through the dance steps of the men, following the flying phoenix forked writing branch that links them to the goddess. The cult of Ou Xiangu was introduced to Putian in 2008, in a series of workshops, Ou Xiangu peishunban 欧仙姑培训班 (Goddess Ou Training Sessions), in the Jiulidong temple in Shiting. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia many women have begun to participate in these initiations. Last year a Xinghua temple in Singapore trained a group of 50 women, the eldest of whom was 80 and the youngest 5. In fact, collective training of spirit mediums has spread across the Xinghua temples in Southeast Asia, even to those whose home communities do not have this ritual tradition (which is found primarily in the Jiangkou region). Spirit medium trainings provide additional solidarity to the Xinghua community abroad, and the ability of many members of the community to go into trance and speak in the name of the gods may help combat the tendencies towards the assertion of hierarchy within the temple, based on wealth and social class. In the Jiangkou region of Putian, the training of mediums has been accelerated by the pull of city jobs on young village men. Training sessions used to occur once in a generation, but nowadays they take place every three to five years. Chinese overseas businessmen, who also were trained in their temples around Southeast Asia, frequently return to participate in these training sessions. Their participation extends beyond assisting with financing the initiations to actually participating in the trainings, thereby performing their ritual knowledge and furthering the expansion of the ritual system.

The key point about these continuously transforming local ritual traditions, constantly circulating back and forth from Southeast China to Southeast Asia, is that they were never static, nor were they anything approaching
standardized or orthodox, empire wide cults or ritual practices. On the contrary, they were simultaneously both translocal, transnational, even global, and yet at the same time resolutely local and particularistic.

2.2 Extended Lineage Networks

The second example of a network or a corridor linking Putian to Southeast Asia is the Huang lineage of Shiting, Putian. Shiting is an elongated super-village which is currently managed by both the Shidong and the Six Administrative Villages. The current population is over 10,000 people, and its population of Overseas Chinese living abroad is over 20,000. The vast majority of the people are of the Huang surname group. There used to be the Liu and the Fang, but these surnames no longer exist because they either moved away or changed their surnames to Huang. The Huang came from Huangxiang 廣西 in Hanjiang 潛江 during the Yuan Dynasty. The fifth generation marked the start of the division into four branches. There is an ancestral hall which was built during the Ming Dynasty and renovated in 1987. Currently, Shiting village is divided into four ritual units called respectively: Dementia 大門甲, Zhonghuajia 中华甲, Houcuojia 后厝甲, and Houtingjia 后亭甲.

The Huang lineage of Shiting is the largest lineage group in the Jiangkou region. The lineage was already very numerous in the Ming and Qing. Their ancestors include officials such as Huang Da Sanxiu and Huang Benqing, who were involved in early irrigation projects in the Jiuliyang irrigated plain of Jiangkou. According to the Huang Lineage Genealogy, the founding Fujian ancestor of the Huang had the taboo name of Hu (Tiger), and was born in Dongxiang of Putian city, where he became a Liansheng student. “During the reign of Emperor Shundi of the Yuan (1333-1368) he went to the town of Huangzhai. He is said to have reclaimed land near there from the sea and built a seawall around it. There he built a home and resided, and this place was known as Shiting (Stone Courtyard).” In the fifth generation, the lineage divided into four branches, namely Gongqi 公启, Gongmo 公谟, Gonglie 公烈, and Gongzhuo 公著. At this time the lineage first became large. In the eighth generation, one “Songjuzhe: 松居者 “built a shrine to the ancestors... and donated lands for the sacrificial rituals.” Clearly a relatively large lineage organization was developed at that time. The descendants of the Gongmo branch are most numerous, while the line of Gongzhuo has died out. The Gongmo branch has further divided into the Wenlian 文廉 and Wenchang 文常 branches, so that there are still four major branches of the Huang lineage in Shiting.

After the Huang lineage ancestral hall was rebuilt in 1987 lineage rituals were revived. The lineage chart and the “Map of the distribution of settlements in each Jia” hanging in the Huang Ancestral Hall reveal the close interrelationships and overlapping residential patterns of the four original branches of the lineage, and demonstrate that lineage organization continues to underlie the temple ritual order in Shiting village. In recent years certain sub-branches have organized new god’s birthday rituals, with the apparent intention of setting up a fifth Jia ritual organization in addition to the original Four Jia. This indicates the potential for transforming a lineage based ritual system into a temple based ritual order. However, these new ritual groups still participate in the ritual activities of the original Four Jia, and still participate in overall rituals according to their original positions in the lineage system. Thus even though there has been a clear trend within Shiting towards the territorial organization of the ritual order based in local temples, the development of these trends still operates under constraints imposed by lineage organization.

The Huang lineage in Shiting and in Southeast Asia is an important example of a transnational lineage (village). The Huang lineage in Shiting has recently printed (1990) a grand lineage genealogy, which includes the biographies of many recent prominent businessmen and politicians, but which does little to address the question of overseas emigration and its causes. A recent hand-written genealogy of one branch of the Huang lineage provides far more concrete evidence of emigration within one branch of the lineage. This document provides a basis for multi-sited ethnography on the extended lineage in Shiting and Southeast Asia. This document makes it clear that many members of the Huang lineage sent overseas were adopted sons with no blood ties to the lineage. They were sent over to sink or swim. If successful, they were welcomed back to Shiting, and their ancestral tablets were placed in the ancestral hall.

In the back hall of the Tongtiangong in Seremban, Malaysia, which has one side hall called Jiulidong, dedicated to the spirit medium tradition mentioned above, and another hall dedicated to a replica of a higher order ritual alliance temple on the Putian plain, one finds a shrine dedicated to the ancestors of the Huang lineage. Abbreviated ritual observances take place at dongzhi (Winter solstice) and Qingming. There are more members of the Huang lineage living in Malaysia and Singapore than there are in Shiting. But many of these members are children of second families, or adopted in sons. Others seem to have bought their way into the Huang lineage to take advantage of its numbers, its facilities
and its business connections. These members are in effect purchasing shares in a trans-national joint-stock corporation, in a form of the lineage described by Zheng Zhenman (2001) as a contractual lineage (hetong zongzu). Flexible membership in “invented” lineages is a common phenomenon in Southeast Asia. One might well ask if this model originated overseas in Southeast Asia, or back in China – where it was often adopted by smaller lineages faced with the pressure of a large lineage. In any case, the experience of flexible associational principles amongst Chinese overseas must have had a considerable impact on their home villages and regions. The merging of lineages stretched to the breaking point with business and trading networks generated a wealth of managerial experience that surely expanded the cultural repertoire of the home villages, towns, and cities of the Xinghua region.

2.3 Buddhist networks

The third and final example of religious networks to be discussed is a Buddhist network linking master and disciple from Putian to Southeast China. In this case one finds the intersecting of multiple Xinghua network strands involved in the rebuilding of the ancient Buddhist monastery, the Guishansi (Turtle Mountain Monastery) back in Huating in Putian. The ancient Buddhist monastery of Guishan had been founded by legendary monks Wuliao and his disciple Huizhong in the Tang, (C.E. 822), and repaired many times over the year (888, 915, 1324-30, 1368-98, 1459, 1611, 1679), and again in 1906, when a new order was established, and monks were sent overseas to develop the monasteries networks (for early inscriptions see Dean and Zheng, 1995). At various times the monastery housed over 500 monks, and relied on its extensive tea plantation for income. The monastery was repaired in the later 1950s, but was completely flattened during the Cultural Revolution. In the Republican period, monks from this monastery somehow made their way to one of the key Chinese temples in Southeast Asia, the Qingyunting (Blue Cloud Pavillion) in Malacca (founded in 1673 by Hokkien merchants). This was the temple where the future Chinese leaders of Singapore, the Straits Chinese, maintained their base. The temple had evolved into a Dazhongmiao, a place of Buddhist rites for the commemoration of the dead, into a temple dedicated to the great gods and goddesses of the Minnan coastal trading network, including Mazu, or Tianhou, Goddess of the Sea. The leaders of this temple were the appointed Kapitan or directors of the Chinese community under the Dutch. Under English colonial rule, they changed their title to that of Tingzhu (Master of the Temple).

The first Putian monk to run Buddhist services at the Qingyunting was Xianglin Fashi (d. 1937), a Buddhist monk from the Guishansi. He performed rituals for the dead and held Dharma Assemblies at the Qingyunting, beginning in 1929. Since then, six more generations of master-disciple transmission have received their ordinations within the monastery, judging from the spirit-tablet altar at the back of the temple. These disciples spread to several Buddhist monasteries around Southeast Asia, including the Jingyesi in nearby Muar on the Malacca Strait, and further afield to Jakarta and Surubaya. The successor of Xianglin Fashi was Master Jinxing (1911-1980). His brother monk Master Jinming was the founder of the Xianglin Monastery, built in commemoration of the founding monk of the Guishansi order, in 1985.

The initiative to rebuild the founding temple of Guishansi in 1986 was led by a monk from the Jingyesi (Monastery of Pure Works) named Master Dingguang, and was completed by his disciple Master Zhen Jing (True Scripture). They worked tirelessly to bring together all the different strands of the diverse Xinghua temple networks across Southeast Asia. Their contributions proved so enormous that they were able to rebuild the Guishansi into a huge temple complex. They also built a road up the steep mountain to the temple at the top. Master Zhen Jing had enough money left over to completely rebuild his entire home village, Yuantoucun, along with a school and a clinic. There was even enough money left over to rebuild another Buddhist monastery, the Xianglinsi (Monastery of the Fragrant Grove), originally founded in 1945, right across the road from the Qingyunting. This monastery is now even larger than the Qingyunting. Inside it, one finds plaques bearing the names of the donors. These include the various Xinghua Huiguan of Malacca and Singapore and elsewhere around Malaysia. Numerous Buddhist monasteries supported by the Xinghua community such as the Guanyninting of Jakarta (itself currently undergoing a massive reconstruction) made contributions. But one also finds mention of several Xinghua Tianhougong temples dedicated to Mazu from around Southeast Asia, as well as some of the Three in One and Jiulidong Spirit Medium Altar Association temples of Singapore on the plaques.

These plaques reveal that the multiple networks of the Xinghua temple systems could converge on a single node and generate very substantial resources reconnecting that node back to the founding monastery in Putian. This example also brings out the importance of mobilizing figures like the Buddhist monks Xianglin, Jinxing, Jinming, Dingguan, and Zhen Jing. These men personify the concept of connective capital (Ichniowski, C and Shaw, K, 2005; Barnes, 2007), and they devoted their lives.
to assisting in the transference of economic capital into religious merit. This example also shows that the Xinghua networks cannot be studied in isolation, but should be seen as part of a larger pattern of interactions back and forth with Putian, which has accumulated cultural and economic resources, managerial experience, and business connections over multiple generations.

3 Conclusions

The role of Chinese overseas in 20th century Chinese modernization projects has been both passionate and paradoxical. For many overseas Chinese elites, the 1911 Revolution and the rise of a new China propelled them into a series of reforms in the fields of education, urban planning and village renewal, architecture, ritual and life-style changes. There were several instances of villages being completely redesigned in the name of re-imagined Chinese tradition. Some went so far as to organize military units to protect their home villages during the turbulent years of the early Republic. Subsequent relations with the PRC after 1949 were even more fraught and contradictory. The Overseas Chinese saw their role as both preserving tradition and simultaneously advocating the modernization of China. When they thought in the 1950s and 1960s that they could no longer return to China, there was an immediate spike in Singapore in the construction of temples dedicated to the gods of their home villages across South and Southeast China. Aside from the Cultural Revolution period, throughout the 20th century, alongside the building of roads, schools, hospitals and factories, there was a steady flow of support (remittances, ritual knowledge, networking) for the construction or repair of traditional ancestral halls, temples, and Buddhist monasteries. One might well ask why ritual activity in contemporary China is not simply an archaic survival of “tradition”, but instead is precisely the site of the current negotiation of the forces of modernity in Southeast China.

From one point of view, the people within these religious networks and corridors seem to live in a parallel reality in which the Cultural Revolution, or indeed, many of the other revolutions of the 20th century (political, social, technological), did not take place, and would appear to have had little impact on the ritual traditions they consider most fundamental to their (trans)local identities. But this view would underestimate the impact of continuous ritual revolutions on Chinese society. Ritual traditions evolve and rework other forces, and many ritual events contain both the possibility of radical change, and the means to re-establish or re-invent social order. Major transformations of Chinese society have been traced to the “ritual revolution” of the 16th century, when lineage ritual spread throughout the Pearl River area (Faure 2007). In our study of the historical evolution of the ritual sphere in the Putian plains, we argued that contemporary rituals build upon and fold in ritual procedures from many traditions and strata – early Buddhist traditions, Daoist rites, lineage rites, village and ritual alliance rites, spirit medium traditions, classical sacrificial rites, and sectarian rites (Dean and Zheng, 2010, Vol.1). Ritual events are characterized by multiple liturgical frameworks, multiple temporalities, and multiple nodes of perception on the event as a whole. Each of these points of view or nodes of interaction within the ritual even has a great potential for autonomy in relation to other nodes and to the deities. This is a key reason why ritual activities in Fujian province are able to work with and transmute state capital, global capital, and local economies. The danger, of course, is that local, state, or global formations will exploit the autonomies of the ritual event in order to frame the temporality of modernity against the multiple temporalities of the ritual event, as a simple and indifferent opposition. The best one could hope for in such circumstances would be a form of alternative modernity, which would simply delay the inevitable subsumption of all relations by capital. This is a real danger because the power of capital also lies in its immanence, in its ability to work within and transform hierarchical formations of local powers. This movement of capital tends to generate contradictions in the ritual space of non-contradictions, which then usually demand resolution in the form of local or national identity.

Both ritual and capital produce worlds. As Lazzarato puts it, “How (are we) to understand concepts of labor, production, cooperation and communication when capitalism is not only a mode of production but a production of worlds?” (Lazzarato 2004:34). The infinitesimal world production of the ritual event asks us to think differently from capital but not oppositionally. It bids us to consider the differently different between capital and ritual. For the ritual event is not simply an obstacle to the movement of capital or a contradiction within it. The promise of what I have described elsewhere as a “microsociology” of contemporary ritual activities in southeast China lies in the attention it calls to the production of worlds within ritual events. The continuing power of these ritual events to absorb and yet not be completely transformed by flows of global capital raises important questions as to the negotiation of modernity in contemporary Putian.3

Another threat to the vitality of the village rituals of the

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3 These passages are drawn from Dean and Lamarre, 2008.
Putian plain is the rapid spread of urbanization. Strange to say, in the Putian case, the increasing polarization between urban and rural realms seems strangely productive, in that many internal migrants sojourning in urban centers, as well as the Chinese soujourning overseas, return to the villages at Chinese New Year celebrations and pour incredible amounts of funding and energy (personal participation) into village ritual events. Thus at an extreme, these villages sometimes appear to be empty shells, with only elderly inhabitants looking after a few children. Nonetheless, they come to life in explosive festivals at New Years, and, with improved transportation links, often at the important birthday festivals of the village deities. I have recently explored the realms of ritual sensation found in these festivals in a documentary film called Bored in Heaven (2010). In some contested suburbs of Putian, villagers have succeeded in forcing the government to pay for the relocation of their temples in amongst the apartment blocks. These temples so far have maintained their ritual activities. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Xiamen, where the outlying villages that were gradually absorbed into the expanding city have largely preserved their temples, which have now formed powerful regional associations with strong ties to Taiwanese temple networks. Many spectacular roadside temples are being built, even closer to the center of Xiamen.

Thinking local or regional history from the point of view of locally emergent modes of power does not deny the rather overwhelming evidence for the high degree of the cultural hegemony of the Confucian state in late imperial China—but it does show the limits of such analysis. No doubt there were many local cultural nexuses of power, different power formations, including ritual-power formations, lineage-power formations, and a wide variety of other local modes of channeling and organizing power across China. Rather than see power only from the imperial perspective as the imposition of a culturally defined unified, hierarchically encompassing, continuum of cosmic authority stretching from the Altar of Heaven to each household shrine to the stove god, we can instead make out a far more complex landscape of alternative workings of local powers and local performances of power. I have suggested here that another of the sources of power and ritual change were the corridors and networks linking the coastal communities of Southeast China to Southeast Asia.

In the ritual events of the Putian plain the power being generated and performed is that of particular communities or ritual alliances expressing a degree of autonomy. One of those powers is the power to generate worlds of difference within ritual that are not absorbed into modernization (cultural tourism) or state control (cultural museumification) but remain vital cosmopolitical resources for villagers in the contemporary Putian region (see Dean and Lamarre 2003; 2007). These cosmopolitical ritual technologies were transportable, like the portable altar of a Daoist priest or the incense ash of a local god’s temple, and they were employed in a great variety of different political and multi-ethnic settings around Southeast Asia. Still the gods appeared, and the rituals continued to evolve in adapting to new environments.

The intrinsic cultural hybridity of the villages of South and Southeast China, combined with their openness to transnational trade and cultural contact, well-established by the Song, and the highly flexible associational forms developed throughout these networks to respond to continually changing conditions at home and abroad, suggest that we conceive of the villages of this region not primarily in terms of how they identified with the imperial center, but rather how they grew to recognize and work with their own differences from that central model, by developing and fostering trans-local social spaces and networks, and creating a consciously hybrid set of distinct cultures which only appear to be local and regional and earthbound from the imperial perspective, but in fact were always already hybrid, translocal, transnational, and continuously transforming.  

It should be emphasized that the networks of the Xinghua Chinese in Southeast Asia also exhibit clear signs of mutual competition, internal conflict, and coercion and exclusivity. For example, there are four different Xinghua Huiguan (regional associations) in Singapore, representing distinct economic classes, regional sub-groups, and even different religious traditions. The Christian Methodists of Putian decided to move up the Rajang river into Borneo, rather than to follow patterns of chain migration to safer and more established enclaves of Xinghua people in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia. Only later, once they had established themselves in Sibu, did they branch out into the major cities of Southeast Asia. The story of the struggle for political and cultural independence of Christian groups in Fujian goes back several centuries, and is one of the keys to understanding the transformation of public spaces and modes of agency and social institutional change in late Qing and Republican times.

Many of the mutually independent temples of the far-flung Jiulidong (Nine Carp Cavern) temple system were founded by spirit mediums who had quarreled with one another, and split off to form new religious communities with their own Altar Association. To this day, these temples

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4 From Dean and Zheng (2010, Vol. 1).
compete over influence and control over the founding temple in Shiting, which has been rebuilt by different Overseas Chinese temple groups three times in the past twenty years. And extended lineages are embroiled in constant disputes over status and the criteria of membership.

In spite of these tensions, in some circumstances networks can join forces, as shown above in the case of the Guishansi. Hard-won membership in an extended lineage leads to many new connections and possibilities. Participation in these networks comes with its own regimes of exchange and reciprocity. New members are mobilized into networks, swept up into new flows. Ritual techniques (like spirit possession) can be imitated and adapted by groups (or genders) that did not originally share these practices in their home villages in Putian. The increasing ease of telecommunications between temple and network leaders, and the ability of overseas temple members to travel rapidly back to Putian, has brought many of these networks into closer interaction, in an ever-intensifying rate of flow, back and forth within the trans-local networks of the Xinghua extended community. Cell-phones, digital cameras and videos, and a host of hand-held devices allow for images and information to flow through the system at ever-increasing volume and velocity. In many respects, the spectacular nature of Chinese popular religious ritual takes on a new power in the digital age, amplified by viral means of transmission. Nowadays, virtual temples populate the Internet, merit from the performance of (virtual?) rituals can be purchased on-line with a credit card, and Buddhist rites are broadcast across the internet in real-time. The Chinese religious networks linking South and Southeast China to Southeast Asia and beyond are exploring new modes of communication to enhance connectivity and speed the transmission of ideas and information and the expansion of their social networks. At times like these, one senses that the God of Theater is having the last laugh on the Nationalist and Communist advocates of the secular modernization of China.

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**Bionotes**

仪式革命：联结莆田与东南亚的寺庙与信任网络

Kenneth Dean

摘要

本文探讨一些寺庙和信任网络，在过去的150年期间，从福建省沿岸的兴化区遍布到东南亚的历史过程和当代发展。本文从莆田兴化扩展到东南亚的八种网络中，深入考察了其中三种网络(福建省莆田市地方志，2001)，分别是 1) 神童坛班网络; 2) 拓展性的宗族网络; 3) 佛教师徒传承网络。这些仪式性的“信任网络”，是从具有世界主义意味的宗教仪式技术中建立起来的可携带性仪式，例如道士的便携式神坛、地方神的庙宇香灰、集体神童训练的方法，抑或是在神坛、祖先牌位或高僧面前主持的宗教仪式。本文将呈现这些仪式手段是如何应用于政况各异、多元民族的东南亚地区。这些仪式网络对于当地的村庄和文化，都具有强大的影响。此外，这些“信任网络”在持续性的仪式革命下，并非简单地以传统形式示人，而是不断地与现代化力量碰撞与融汇，丰富了多元化的仪式内涵。

1 导言

宗教网络的扩张，是当今全球化中最为重要的文化因素之一。在过去的三十年里，成千上万地方神庙宇和地方化仪式传统在中国南部及东南部乡村中复兴，是与当地众多庙宇及延伸至东南亚的分香网络之间重新流动之仪式知识、资金、劳动力和信仰紧密联系。虽然对比于基督教在中国北部的迅速传播，这些地方神庙宇网络与仪式传统之变革较少为人知，但在中国日新月异的时代背景下，它们显然是农村日常生活中的一股强大力量。

本文探讨一些寺庙和信任网络，在过去的150年期间，从福建省沿岸的兴化区遍布到东南亚的历史过程和当代发展。本文从莆田兴化扩展到东南亚的八种网络中，深入考察了其中三种网络(福建省莆田市地方志，2001)，分别是 1) 神童坛班网络; 2) 拓展性的宗族网络; 3) 佛教师徒传承网络。这些仪式性的“信任网络”，是从具有世界主义意味的宗教仪式技术中建立起来的可携带性仪式，例如道士的便携式神坛、地方神的庙宇香灰、集体神童训练的方法，抑或是在神坛、祖先牌位或高僧面前主持的宗教仪式。本文将呈现这些仪式手段是如何应用于政况各异、多元民族的东南亚地区。这些仪式网络对于当地的村庄和文化，都具有强大的影响。此外，这些“信任网络”在持续性的仪式革命下，并非简单地以传统形式示人，而是不断地与现代化力量碰撞与融汇，丰富了多元化的仪式内涵。
2 仪式革命

在庆祝1911辛亥革命的百年纪念上，回顾海外华人在近代史上的这个重要转折点上的关键作用是至关重要的。作为革命者、改革者、财政支持者、教育和社会改革的推动者，海外华人成为了一股现代化的力量。他们是现代化建设的积极支持者。比如陈嘉庚(1874-1961)，以新加坡为基地，在改革运动中扮演着十分活跃的角色——资助现代化高校和教育改革、提倡社会改革、鼓励城市规划、村社管理和重建，以及致力于建立全新的建筑风格。

由海外华人领导的反帝国主义之起义，可以追溯到19世纪的福建。小刀会起义的其中一位领导人，就是一位海外华商之子。海外华人在领导或招募军队上所扮演的角色，也可以从1920年代的菲律宾华裔资助活跃在福建晋江的乡土防卫队中看到。

另一方面，通过保存传统或予以创新，华人在其侨乡也带来了巨大冲击。许多海外华人都资助其家乡宗祠、庙宇的建设。在海外的华族社区中，宗教和仪式发挥了重要的作用。在海外社区里，华侨资助并参与建设来自华南家乡的分香庙宇。从这个角度而言，海外华人可被视为守护中华文化的一股传统力量。

海外华人往往被放置在中国近代史上的重大转折点——辛亥革命的背景下进行讨论。在这场革命中，他们的支持起到了至关重要的作用。中国共产党的建立，正是许多海外华人回到中国为社会主义实验贡献的时刻；在文革期间，许多海外华人感到被中国抛弃，继而决心在这个反传统的时代下保护传统文化；最终在邓小平时代，海外华人又恢复了作为领导创新的先行者，但主要还是扮演着投资者、厂商和金融投机者的角色。这些海外的华裔商界领袖，被Aihwa Ong和Donald Nonini描述为一群无根基帝国的弹性公民(Ong and Nonini, 1997; Ong, 1999)。

在20世纪80、90年代，由于弹性积累系统的发展，标榜着全球资本主义掀起了根本性的转变。这段时期的特点是：金融资本的迅速流动、工厂外包到廉价劳动力的地区、以技术性人员和办公室员工为中级干部的结构发展，以及伴随着包袱心极强的资本主义领袖和金融精英。这些经济变化深刻地影响了连接海外华人与侨乡和中国多个区域的走廊。企业领导者成为了弹性公民和创造另类亚洲现代化的先驱者(Ong and Nonini, 1997; Ong, 1999)。

然而，他们同时也指出，劳工和中级办公室员也被迫适应这种全新的移动模式。这些经济变化与改革开放海外华人跨国空间之政治序幕同时发生。就这个角度而言，在过去的几十年里，海外华人可被视为在全球化条件下极富弹性的资本主义力量。

本文将对这些类别、对立和理解提出一些探讨。首先，海外华人最基本的本质。正如Philip Kuhn(2009)在其《生活在他者世界的华人》(Chinese Amongst Others)一书的彻底概述中曾指出，许多海外华人将自己设想为海外旅居者，在东南亚经商地和侨乡之间的走廊上居住和迁徙——这些走廊是一种跨地域的延伸空间。在最近的一篇论文(Dean, n.d.)中，勾勒出了侨乡的连续统一体。
以一些侨乡作为考察对象，发现一些在村内只是为数甚少的家庭或氏族，却在海外各有特定的集聚点，而且几乎每家每户都有亲戚居住在东南亚。这些村民对空间的想象是非常广大的，并且不仅仅是止于想象——而是通过参与迁移链网络，村民可以从中国侨乡走向东南亚，甚至是走到这些区域之外，往往反复，不绝如缕。正如Peggy Levitt (2004, 2007) 提醒我们的，神明是不需要护照的。

其次，海外华人的多样性。他们来自不同的地域文化、说着不同的汉族方言。他们也祭祀着来自不同侨乡的地方神，并实践着各具风格的仪式传统和仪式形式。在东南亚的一些地区里，这些社区还保持着来自家乡的地方戏曲、地方音乐，地方性道教仪式专家，以及专门祭祀当地祖先的神童坛班。此外，海外华人往往也是多重网络的成员，因此，他们可能属于地方性的同乡会馆，同时也属于来自侨乡的庙宇会员，或自发地参与从家乡扩展到东南亚的宗教运动。他们也很可能是东南亚佛教寺院的赞助者，其中的一部分人也通过师徒关系，与中国南部和东南部的祖庙联系起来。

其三，海外华人不仅仅是传统的守护者，同时也是将许多经过革新后、文化、社会、仪式带回中国家乡者。我会讨论许多发生在东南亚、后来又被引介到中国侨乡文化体系的变化案例。同时，我认为这是一个可以延伸到5、600年的漫长过程——这一过程不能单独地与标准的历史分期相联系。

以下将在这里讨论的三个案例，是发生在从莆田，延伸到福建和东南亚的仪式网络中。相较于最迟就从15世纪以来便已经往来的闽南移民，莆田村民迁移到东南亚是一个相对较晚的现象。当然，这也可以发现来自兴起的跨国交易之最早记录，包括一篇来自莆田的宋朝碑文，记述了一个中国船长是如何航行抵达三佛齐（可能是现在的巨港），并已赚到了倍倍利润返回莆田(Dean and Zheng, 1995)。然而，大规模的兴化人迁移海外，仅发生于19世纪末和20世纪初之间。在抵达新加坡和马来西亚时，兴化移民发现自己已经被排除在许多由更早迁移的移民群体，例如闽南人、广东人、客家人和潮州人——所做的行业之外，兴化旅居者只好全力集中于一个疾速转变的商机——运输行业。从人力车夫和英国自行车店职员起步，兴化的企业家很快地就建立了自己的连锁店，专门销售自行车、自行车配件和维修服务。随着运输业的急剧扩张，他们在自行车配件分销网络中有效地垄断了市场，继而进入了经销摩托车、汽车及汽车配件、公共汽车、乙醇工厂，以及豪华车奔驰的经销权。今日，一些兴化商人已经跻身于东南亚最富有的经济领袖，许多世界级的商业巨子。其实也被培训为神童。

莆田平原灌溉区原本是处于海平面30米以下，是经过了一千多年的时间，这片土地才从海上冲积起来。在这
Ritual revolutions: Temple and Trust networks linking Putian and Southeast Asia

In the fertile alluvial plains of Putian, there are four main irrigation systems, and each village has a first, second, or third-class irrigation waterway. Among these, three irrigation systems were eventually incorporated into a mega-complex canal system that depended on sluice gates. During high tides, the sluices were closed to collect freshwater; during low tides, they were opened to release water. Around the mid-16th century, this region witnessed the establishment of its first societal alliance. This alliance brought together multiple villages and clans along a specific canal, characterized by common pilgrimage rituals and higher-tier temples. These temples became the centers of irrigation management, coordinating the maintenance of canals and irrigation systems. Over time, 150 such ritual alliances emerged across the Putian plains, linking up to 724 villages. In some cases, these temples were assigned to coordinate the reconstruction of embankments or levees, or to allocate water among the systems, or even to mediate disputes. However, as the irrigation systems became more complex, most disputes were handled by higher-tier temples. By the 19th century,随着系统内部的纠纷迅速蔓延，灌溉系统出现消减的趋势。巨大的人口压力、水权的竞争、运河淤塞，以及国家控制权的崩溃等，使得灌溉系统内的冲突更难以处理。莆田平原的村庄分裂成一个互相竞争的大棋盘，由旗帜鲜明的多个联盟对峙而成。这种矛盾和冲突加剧了系统的不断缩小，水源短缺和严重干旱遍布全野（Dean and Zheng, 2 vols, 2010）。

These tensions led to an increase in migration, which eventually formed at least 8 interregional or international networks:
1. Expansionist clan networks;
2. Village temple-based networks;
3. Temple-based ritual alliance networks;
4. Tongban networks;
5. Three-one networks; 
6. Buddhist monk networks; 
7. Boundary (1660–1680, Qing government planning coastal migrations) fisher-farmer networks; 
8. Missionary networks, led by Liang Nai (1849-1924), in the new Jerusalem of Pekanbaru, during the period of British colonial rule.

We recently investigated the religious activities of the 724 villages in the Putian plains (Dean and Zheng 2010), recording public rituals centered on the worship of the gods in rural villages in Putian since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1979. With the relaxation of official policies on religious activities, thousands of temples were rebuilt across the Putian plains, and traditional local ritual traditions were also reactivated, with deep secret rituals gradually being reorganized or newly created. Through the distribution and frequency of villagers actively worshiping the gods in each village, we demonstrated the importance of these ritual traditions.

These temples also functioned as “second governments” that were more efficient than national officials and local governments (Dean 2001). These temples were central to the organization of public rituals, which became the core of village temples. They also hosted the training of神童 (divine children), who performed ritual seances and transmitted divine blessings into households. When public rituals and the divine children’s seances were taking place outside the temples, the temples also invited priests and other ritual experts to perform rituals inside. Meanwhile, temples were the social, economic, and moral centers of the villages, and also the cultural centers of leisure. In times of leisure, villagers gathered to play cards or mahjong, while individual believers could burn incense and pay homage, while children played inside the temples. Rituals centered on village temples effectively balanced capitalism and nationalism, and at the same time preserved the vitality of local cultures.

What kind of ritual identity did the Putian plains reveal? How did these rituals reflect the identity and development of these communities in Southeast Asia? In these rituals, multiple different ritual frameworks and perspectival points were integrated, and in the act of celebrating the birthday of the gods, all villagers (or members of the religious networks) were mobilized. These religious rituals were presented in daily life, characterized by the mobility of offerings and the competitiveness of local power, rather than as a detached, solemn moment. At the same time, these events were also occasions for overseas Chinese to contribute funds, ritual knowledge, active participation, and remote management.

2.1 Tongban networks

These overseas Chinese Tongban networks originated from the Tongban collective training within the temples in Jiangkou, Putian (Dean and Zheng, 1993). One of the earliest practices was the Nine-Dragon Cave in Shitou Village. In the 1920s, some of these Nine-Dragon Cave members emigrated to Singapore, maintaining religious rituals there. In the 1950s, these temple members established temples in Indonesia (1960s Dinding and Kereta, 1970s Medan and Jakarta). Other temples were also established in Malaysia (Fuliong and Kuching). As more and more overseas Chinese immigrants, who dominated the shipping industry in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, accumulated wealth status, these religious rituals were preserved. In the period of the Cultural Revolution in China, they preserved these local ritual traditions in Southeast Asia, and returned to Putian in the 1980s and 1990s to reconstruct temples, hold training classes, and introduce new ritual innovations, such as female seances. This female seance group, which made open exchanges with the goddess Guanyin, was established in the Dinding Nine-Dragon Cave in the late 1970s. In the temple, the divine children developed a set of rituals corresponding to those of male divine children. After successfully completing the training, female divine children were awarded diplomas in Daoism and Buddhism. Then, they could participate in the male divine children’s rituals, but danced in a counter-clockwise direction, weaving in and out of the male dancers’ steps with the help of the phoenix sticks.

In 2008, the Nine-Dragon Cave Tongban held a series of training classes for the goddess, which were transmitted to Putian and then to other regions in Southeast Asia. This Tongban training has provided additional cohesion for overseas Chinese immigrants, allowing some members to take on the role of speaking in the name of the gods to challenge the trend of increasing control of the temples by wealthy and socially powerful individuals. In the Jiangkou region, the young men who worked in the cities拉动了神童班。在过去，神童班每隔一代才进行一次，但现在却变成每三至五年进行一次。曾经在东南亚的庙宇中获得培训的海外华商，经常返回莆田参加培训。这些海外华商的加入，不仅仅是为了提供资金、仪式知识、积极参与，以及远程管理，更是为了将这些宗教仪式融入当地的宗教网络，以及将这些宗教仪式推广到东南亚的其他地区，使得更多的女性能够参加这些仪式。
也是从演示自身的仪式知识中，推动了仪式传统的发展。这些不断变换的地方仪式传统，不断地从华南与东南亚循环来回的关键点是，他们从来都不是一成不变的，也不是接近任何标准或正统，或是国家宗教或仪式实践。相反的，他们具有跨域性、跨国性，甚至全球性的特性。在某一时间内，又是极富地方性和特殊性的。

2.2 延展性的宗族网络

连接莆田与东南亚的网络或走廊之第二个例子，是莆田石庭的黄姓家族。石庭是时下由石东、石西两个行政村共同管理的特大狭长村庄。目前石庭的人口超过1万人，海外旅居的石庭人却超过2万人，而且绝大多数都来自黄姓家族。这里的居住者曾经是刘姓和方姓家族，但现在这些姓氏不复存在，因为他们不是已经远离，就是该姓为黄。

元代，黄姓家族从涵江的黄巷移民而来。以第五代为标志，该姓开始分为四个分支。当地有一个建于明代的祠堂，并于1987年重修。现在，石庭村分成四个仪式群体，分别是大门甲、中华甲、后厝甲和后亭甲。

石庭的黄姓家族是江口地区最大的家族集团。在明清时期，黄姓家族已经非常庞大。他们的祖先包括姓黄的官员，都参与了早期江口九鲤洋灌溉平原的灌溉项目。根据黄姓族谱，黄氏的入闽始祖取“虎”为讳名，出生于莆田市的东乡。在元顺帝（1333年至1368年）时期，他来到了黄宅镇。据说他在附近开垦了土地，并在四周围建了海堤。他在这里成家定居，这片地方则被称为“石庭”（石家大院）。在第五代，家族分出了四个支系，即公启、公谟、公烈和公著，这是此家族第一次获得拓展。第八代，一位“松居者为祖先建立了祠堂——并捐赠土地以作祭祀仪式之用”，很明显的，这是一个相对大型的宗族组织从该时发展起来。当公著一支逐渐消失，公谟一支的后代是枝叶繁茂，后来更发展分为文廉、文常两支，故石庭的黄姓宗族依然是四大分支。

黄氏宗祠于1987年重建之后，宗族仪式随即恢复。挂在黄氏宗祠里的谱系图和“每甲定居分布图”，显示了四大分支的密切关系和相互重叠的居住方式，并展现了宗族组织持续为石庭村的庙宇仪式奠定制度。近年来，某些副分支组织了新的神明诞辰仪式，彰显着欲在原来四甲之外设置第五甲仪式组织的明确意图。这表明了以宗族为基础的仪式传统，正向以庙宇为基础的仪式传统转变的潜力。然而，这些新兴祭祀团体仍然参与原有四甲仪式活动，并仍然根据其在宗族系统的原始地位参与整个仪式。

黄氏家族在石庭和东南亚是一个跨国宗族（村）的重要例子。石庭的黄氏家族最近（1990）印制了一本庞大的宗谱，其中包括许多近代的显赫商人和政治家之传记，但甚少提到海外移民的问题及其原因。一个近代的黄氏家族分支之一的家谱手稿提供了比较具体的分支证据。该文献提供了石庭与东南亚的延展性宗族的多项分支系统，并明确指出许多被送往海外的黄氏成员属于养子，与黄姓宗族没有血缘关系。他们都被放逐在外，自生自灭。如果能够出人头地，则欢迎他们回归石庭，他们的祖宗牌位也可以被请入祠堂接受供奉。

在马来西亚芙蓉市的通天公的后厅，有一个配殿叫九鲤洞，也就是为了之前所提到的神明传统而设置的。另一个大厅则设有莆田平原高阶位的仪式联盟庙宇的副本，可以看到一个供奉黄氏祖先的神龛。每年冬至和清明节，这里都会举行小规模的宗教仪式。居住在马来西亚和新加坡的黄氏子孙比居住在石庭者还多，但大多数是二房的孩子，或是养子。其他人则在黄氏，其实是为了解决其家族的数量、设施和商业网络上的优势。这些成员实际上正如郑振满（2001）所述的合约宗族形式，在跨国股份公司里购买股票。在东南亚，宗族的弹性入族方式是一个普遍现象。有者或许会问，这种模式究竟是起源于海外——东南亚，还是中国？是否是为了解决小型宗族在面对大宗族的巨大压力时所借鉴的一部分呢？在任何情况下，海外华人灵活应变的原则经验，都能对其家乡地区产生一定程度的影响。延伸到商业和贸易网络的宗族合并，必然产生更深入的文化剧目，为兴化内的家乡、市镇和城市获取绝对扩展的管理经验。

2.3 佛教教师徒传承网络

第三个，也是最后一个将要讨论的宗教网络，是联接莆田和东南亚的佛教教师徒网络。在这个案例中，可以发现华族佛教教师徒传承网络是多层次的，且涉及佛教古寺的复建，如莆田华亭的龟山寺。在唐代（公元822年），传奇僧人无了禅师及其弟子慧忠禅寺建立了古刹龟山寺，并在随后多年（888, 915, 934—30, 1368—98, 1649, 1691, 1679）陆续修葺。在1906年进行修复时，一个新制度建立了起来，龟山寺僧人被派遣到海外发展寺院网络（早期文献请参照Dean and Zheng, 1995）。在不同阶段，该寺经历了超过500名僧侣，依靠种植丰富的茶树来维持收支。1950年代末，该寺又进行了一次修复，却在文革期间被夷为平地。民国时期，该寺的僧侣辗转来到东南亚最重要的庙宇之一——马六甲的青云亭（由福建商人兴建于1673年）。就在这座庙宇内，未来的新加坡华人领袖、海峡华人们培植势力的基地。该庙从一个大宗庙，一个以举行佛教仪式纪念死者的场所，演变成为一个专门供奉闽南沿海交易网络中的伟大神灵或女神，包括妈祖，或称天后，海洋女神的庙宇。该庙的领导人，是荷兰殖民地政府任命的甲必丹，也是华人社群的领导导。转换成英国殖民地政府统治之后，这些华人领袖把头衔改为亭主。

第一位在青云亭提供佛教服务的莆田法师，是来自龟山寺的佛教僧人香林法师（d. 1937）。从1929年起，他为死者举办超度仪式，并在青云亭举行法会。根据亭内后殿供奉的神主牌显示，从那时开始，该亭经历了超过六代的师徒传承。这些徒弟辗转来到周围的东南亚佛寺，包括在马六甲海峡的麻坡净业寺，以及印尼雅加达和苏腊巴亚。香林法师的继承者是金星大师（1911—1980），其师兄金明大师是香林寺的开山鼻祖。该寺建于1985年，是为纪念
念创造龟山寺的高僧法脉。

1986年，马来西亚麻坡净土寺的定光大师倡导重建莆田祖庭龟山寺，该寺最终由其徒真经大师完成重建的壮举。他们不知疲倦地将东南亚众多兴化佛寺网络聚集起来，集腋成裘，将祖庭龟山寺重建为一座庄严殊胜的佛教古刹，同时也铺设了一条沿着陡峭山壁通向山顶寺庙的山路。重建龟山寺的余韵，真经大师常来重建他的家乡，因头村，包括一座学校和一问诊所。不仅如此，真经大师还有足够的经费重建马六甲的另一座佛寺——香林寺。该寺创建于1945年，与马六甲古寺青云亭仅隔一条街。今日，香林寺的规模甚至大于青云亭。在香林寺内，可以发现镌刻着捐助者芳名的牌匾。他们来自马六甲、新加坡和马来西亚其他地区的多间兴会会馆。由兴化移民资助的众多佛教寺院，如雅加达的观音亭（目前也在进行大规模重建）也捐款支持。除此之外，牌匾上还可以发现东南省供奉妈祖的几座兴化天后宫，以及一些新加坡的三教和九鲤洞的捐赠支持。

这些捐款匾揭示了兴化寺庙系统的多重网络可以在一个单独的节点上复数呈现，并且产生巨大的影响。这些捐款匾重新联接到莆田的祖庭，与无远弗届。这个例子也彰显了香林、金星、金明、定光和真经等佛教高僧的移动形象之重要性。正是这些倡导使得“连接性资本”的概念出现人格化（Ichniowski, C and Shaw, K, 2005; Barnes, 2007）, 并且奉献了他们一生为经济性资本转移到宗教性公德。同时，这个例子也显示了兴化网络研究不能孤立进行，应被视为在莆田和东南亚之间大规模往返不息的一小部分，以及积累了丰富的文化资源、经济资源、管理经验和跨越多代的贸易联系。

3 结论

海外华人在20世纪中国的现代化计划中所扮演的角色，一直是既激qing洋溢又充满矛盾的。对于许多海外华侨精英而言，辛亥革命和新中国的崛起，让他们卷入了一系列领域的改革运动，包括教育、城市规划、村庄重建、建筑设计、仪式和生活方式。许多村庄在重新塑造中国传统之名义下被彻底重新规划。有些甚至自组军队，在动荡不安的民国初期保护自己的家乡。1949年后，他们与中华人民共和国的关系仅能充满忧虑和矛盾。海外华人视自本身为保守传统者，同时也是倡导中国现代化的角色。20世纪50、60年代，当他们知道自己再也回不了中国时，新加坡便出现了建立佛寺来自华南家乡神明庙宇之机遇。除了文革时期，在整个20世纪里，伴随着建设侨乡道路、学校、医院和工厂的热潮，同时出现了修缮传统宗祠、庙宇和佛寺工程的稳定资金流（通过汇款、仪式知识、网络）。可能有人会问，为何当代中国的仪式活动不是一种简单的维护传统之古风运动，而是在华夏展现出一股与现代化趋势碰撞与融合的力量？

从一个角度来看，这些宗教网络和走廊里的华人似乎生活在一个与文化革命，或者还包括其它20世纪许多革命（政治、社会、技术）并未发生的所在地，所以对他们以仪式传统作为自我认同核心之影响微乎极微。然而，这种观点可能会低估了持续性仪式革命对中国社会的影响。仪式传统能唤起其他力量，许多仪式活动包含了彻底改变的可能性，以及重建社会或创新制度的影响。其中，中国社会的重大变革，可追溯到16世纪的“仪式革命”，当时宗族仪式盛行于整个珠江流域（Faurie 2007）。在我们对莆田平原仪式网络的历史演变研究中，我们认为当代仪式是建立在许多传统仪式和阶层的程序中，并予以融合，如早期的佛教传统、道教仪式，宗族仪式、村庄和祭祀联盟仪式、神童传统、经典化祭祀礼仪和教派仪式（Dean and Zheng, 2010, Vol.1)。从整体而言，仪式活动以重生仪式框架、多重时段和多重观点为特征。在仪式活动内的每一个观点或细节互动，都有其自身与其它点或神明互动的巨大潜力。这也是为何福建的仪式活动能与国家、全球资本，以及当地经济共同运作的关键原因。当然，这也存在着一些危险成分：地方、国家或是全球结构也会削弱仪式活动的自治权，从而把现代化的时间性与仪式活动的时间性框架在一个对立面。在这种情况下，最好是形成一个另类的现代化选择，借以延缓地壳于资本主义下的各种关系。这是一个真正的危险，因为资本主义将潜在地地方力量之内部运作和改变结构。这类资本活动倾向于在没有矛盾的仪式空间中产生矛盾，它们经常依赖处理地方认同或国家级认的方法。

仪式和资本都能创造世界。正如Lazzarato所说：“当资本主义生产仅是一个模式，而是世界的一个产物，（我们）应该如何了解劳动、生产、合作、交流的概念？”（Lazzarato 2004:34）仪式活动中的微观世界产物要求我们以不同的方式思考资本，而不是以对立的方式。它促使我们考虑资本和仪式之间的各种不同。因为仪式活动不仅仅是资本流动的阻碍，或内在的矛盾。我曾描述华南的当代仪式为“微观社会学”，就在于它要求在仪式活动中关注世界。这些仪式活动的持续性力量在吸纳着，而不完全被融入的全球资本提出了重要的问题，是为当代莆田现代化之协商。

对莆田平原乡村仪式生命力的另一个威胁，是来自城市化的迅速普及。说来也怪，在莆田的这个案例中，城市和农村之间的两极分化似乎富有成效，许多旅居城市的内地移民就像旅居海外的华人一样，纷纷在农历新年间回到农村，并将大量的资金和精力（个人参与）全情投入乡村仪式活动中。因此，在相反的极端情况下，有时候这些村庄似乎变成了空壳似的，只有老年居民照顾着几个孩子。尽管如此，每逢农历新年的大型规模节庆，以及乡村神明的重要诞辰，乡村迅速恢复生机，交通也获得改善。我最近把探索这些大规模的节庆仪式活动拍摄成纪录片《天堂无眠》（2010）。在一些具有争议性的莆田村子里，村民们已经成功地迫使政府支付他们搬迁寺庙到公寓的费用。这些寺庙至今都保持着自己的仪式活

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6 这段引自 Dean and Lamarre, 2008.
动。类似的现象也出现在厦门，有些边远村庄在逐渐融入和不断扩大的城市中保留了自己的寺庙，形成了可以与台湾庙宇互相联系的强大地域性网络。许多庄严的庙宇在路边耸起，甚至更接近厦门的中心。

从权力区域浮现模式的角度思考当地或地域性历史，并不否认在晚期帝制中儒教文化处于国家霸权的压倒性证据——但它确实表明了这种分析的局限性。毫无疑问，这里存在着许许多多的地方文化之权力联系、不同力量的形成，包括仪式权力、宗族力量的形成，以及各种各样铺盖中国的其他地方管道模式和组织力量。

不应只从帝制的角度把权力看作一种文化统一、阶级制度的无所不包、从天坛延展到每户人家中的灶神神龛之持续性宇宙权威，而应该发展出一个更多元的地方权力和地方权力演绎之运作景观。在这里，我认为仪式和仪式变化的另一个来源，是连接着华南沿海社群和东南亚的走廊之网络。在莆田平原的仪式活动中，特定群体或仪式联盟所酝酿之力量，显示了一定程度的自主权。其中一股力量是在仪式中产生了另一个差异的世界，它并没有被现代化(文化旅游)或者国家控制(文化博物化)所吸收，而是为当代莆田地区的村民们保留了重要的世界性资源。

华南村庄的内在文化之杂糅性，结合了自身对跨国贸易和文化交流的接纳与开放。完善确立于宋朝，高度灵活的结社形式的网络中，得到充分发展并足以应对国内外不断变化的状况。在某些情况下，这些网络还是可以汇聚成一股力量，就如上述的龟山寺重建案例。来之不易的入族制度，为扩展性宗族带来许多新的联系和可能性。参与这些网络伴随着自身的交换和互惠制度。新成员在网络中移动，被新潮流席卷而上。仪式技巧(如神明扶乩)可以被学习模仿，或适应于不同的群体(或性别)，但这些技巧原本并不能在莆田家乡内流传和分享。庙宇与网络之间越来越便捷的电子设备沟通方式，以及海外庙宇成员可以迅速回到家乡的能力，已经被许多网络的互动交流所确证，并在兴化广大群体的跨域网络中来回回流。手机、数码相机和视频，以及一系列的手持电子设备使得图像和信息以不断增加的容量和速度在该系统流通。在许多方面，华族的民间宗教仪式之惊人本质被病毒般的传播手段放大，成为了数字时代的新力量。如今，虚拟庙宇进驻互联网，(虚拟)仪式演绎的功德可以通过在线信用卡支付购买，佛教仪式可以在网上实时播出。连接华南与东南亚乃至之外的华族宗教网络正在探索加强沟通、加速思想和消息传播及其社会网络扩展的新模式。直到这个时代，人们才意识到戏剧之神田都元帅在国民党与共产党所主张的中国世俗现代化中笑到了最后。